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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
vs. 
PATRY CURTIS, 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
Case No. 13879 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Patry Curtis, appeals conviction 
of distributing a controlled substance, amphetamine, 
in violation of Section 58-37-8(A)(a)(ii), Utah Code 
Ann. (1953). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 
the Honorable Bryant Croft, Judge, found defendant guilty 
of distribution of a controlled substance for value. The 
defendant Curtis was fined the sum of $5,000 and sen-
tenced to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term 
of not more than ten years. 
On October 15, 19 74, one day prior to trial, 
Judge Croft conducted a hearing on the issue of entrap-
ment. After evidence had been presented, he ruled that Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter L w Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
no entrapment occurred, as a matter of law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court 
affirming the verdict and judgment of the Fourth District 
Court in this case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In April, 1973, Rose Ann Stout was employed 
by the Region Four Drug Task Force as an undercover 
police agent. Her contact with defendant Patry Curtis 
commenced in late March or early April of the next 
year. Entrapment Hearing 30 hereinafter cited with an 
H. (T.6). Curtis was a well known figure in the Provo 
area for his involvement with the criminal element. 
Trial Transcript 60, hereinafter cited with a T. Miss 
Stout1s assignment was to contact him in her capacity as 
a narcotics agent. While a "friendship" developed between 
them, there is no evidence that a sexual relationship 
evolved. Miss Stout denies such inferences emphatically 
(T.37). While they were together on many occasions, there 
was never a showing that a romantic relationship had developed. 
For example, no witness ever testifed that he observed 
them holding hands, or kissing, let alone having any first 
hand knowledge that there was sexual intercourse. Miss I 
Stout wore a "bugging" device quite often, allowing other) 
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members of the Task Force to monitor the conversations, 
Ralph Lee Harper, director of the Region Four Drug Task 
Force corroborated Miss Stout1s testimony, having listened 
to many conversations between Miss Stout and Mr. Curtis 
(T. 50-53, 90-99). 
The particular sale of narcotics in question 
was initiated on June 17, 19 74, by Mr. Curtis. He came 
to Miss Stout's home, alone, at about 3:00 p.m., and 
spoke to her through the bedroom window, telling her 
that he had "some more speed (amphetamines) available" 
(T. 9). Later that same day, he called her at the Country 
Club where she worked and made arrangements to meet her 
at the Rodeway Inn around 11:30 p.m. Miss Stout tele-
phoned him later that evening, just after 11:00 p.m., 
in a taped conversation, from the Task Force Office, order-
ing five hundred pills (T.8-13). 
With a monitoring device attached to her person, 
and supplied with $100 from the Task Force, Rose Ann 
Stout made her connection with Mr. Curtis just after mid-
night, at the Rodeway Inn. The defendant gave her five 
small plastic sacks, containing approximately one hundred 
amphetamines each, in return for one hundred dollars. A 
pre-arranged signal was given upon completion of the sale, 
and defendant was arrested. He had been under surveillance 
by other members of the Drug Task Force Team (T. 14-16). 
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There is no evidence that defendant was coerced 
into a nonvoluntary sale. While doubting the inducing power 
of a sexual relationship, respondent submits that defendant 
was never involved sexually with the witness Rose Ann 
Stout; and assuming such, the alleged relationship would 
have terminated more than two months earlier. As the 
trial judge pointed out, it was. . . 
"(n)ot a crucial point. . .(since) 
he can still willingly make sales of 
drugs. . . It seems rather clear to 
me that whatever Mr. Curtis1 activi-
ties were by June 17th, he was perfect-
ly willincr to make a sale to Miss Stout.11 
(T. 113-115) 
. ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL JUDGE, WITHIN CHS DISCRETION, PROP-
ERLY LIMITED THE QUESTIONING TO THE LIMITS ALLOWED BY 
STATUTE ALLOWED BY STATUTE AND RULES OF EVIDENCE. 
During both the entrapment hearing and the 
trial, defense counsel repeatedly sought to show that 
Rose Ann Stout's motives in joining the Task Force 
and her credibility were suspect. To do this, he offered 
testimony of her alleged use of narcotic and sexual 
promiscuity. These allegations were flatly denied by 
Miss Stout (H. 37-46). When defense counsel revealed such 
intentions, the court responded: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"It really doesn't matter what your 
theory is, if your evidence with respect 
to credibility is not legally admissible. 
I don't think we ouaht to go into it. I 
don't think the testimony of immoral acts, 
or whether or not a crime has been committed• 
and not prosecuted is admissible, other 
than general reputation in a community 
for truth and veracity. I don't think 
you can go into a person's reputation 
on the questions of credibility, and to 
show that she has worked at one time 
as a prostitute or if she took drugs 
of something of that nature." (H. 10) 
Throughout the hearing and trial, the court 
exercised proper judicial discretion in limiting defense 
counsel's questions to the facts and issues to be decided 
and blocked peripheral expeditions. Defense counsel had 
complete freedom to challenge Miss Stout's "character 
for truth, honesty, or integrity" with proper evidence 
(Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-1 (1953).) The court's rulings 
merely limited counsel's use of improper evidence and 
testimony. Respondent submits that the court was 
extremely cooperative and liberal in allowing a great 
deal of collateral testimony to be given. It even 
allowed the defense to present testimony to be given. It 
even allowed the defense to present testimony concerning 
Miss Stout which was highly embarrassing to her (T.97-98). 
It is the law that the extent of cross-examination 
is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge. 
State v. Anderson, 27 Utah 2d 276, 495 P.2d 804 (1972). 
The court correctly ruled concerning defendant's attempts 
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to show Miss Stout's alleged use of narcotics. Evidence 
of narcotics use is not admissible on the ground that it 
is relevant to witness credibility. People v. Enriquez, 
(Cal. App.) 11 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1961). It is the positive 
duty of the trial judge to supervise conduct of a trial 
so that examination of witnesses is kept within reasonable 
bounds of relevance; the scope and extent of collateral 
issues for purposes of impeachment rests largely in the 
trial court's discretion. State v. Belote, 213 Kan. 291, 
516 P.2d 159 (1973). In Belote, supra, when defense 
counsel tried to show that the undercover aaent's prior 
conviction of drug offenses impaired the credibility of 
the witness, the court excluded such questions. The 
Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the action and stated: 
"Drug offenses per se do not involve 
dishonesty or false statements in their 
commission; thus, convictions for such 
offenses are inadmissible for purposes 
of impairing credibility of witness." 
In summary, it is essential that this court 
find a "clear abuse of discretion" in order to reverse 
defendant's conviction. Respondent has shown that the 
exercise of the trial judge's discretion was within 
statutory bounds and that there has been no clear proof 
of abuse of that discretion. Therefore, the conviction 
ought to be affirmed. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT II 
• ASSUMING TRIAL COURT!S LIMITATION OF DEFENSE 
QUESTIONING CONSTITUTED ERROR, IT WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL 
TO ANY SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT OF THE DEFENDANT. 
The Utah Code Ann. § 77-4 2-1 (19 53), states: 
"After hearing an appeal the court . 
must give judgment without regard to 
errors or defects which do not affect 
the substantial rights of the parties. 
If error has been committed, it 
should not be presumed to have resulted 
in prejudice. The court must be satis-
fied that it has that effect before 
it is warranted in reversing the 
judgment." 
The purpose of a trial is to see that justice 
is done. The trial court rulings concerning testimony 
and evidence about a witness1 alleged improprieties were 
merely collateral to the main issue, which was the guilt 
or innocence of the defendant Patry Curtis. As to meeting 
standards of protection for his rights, the court did an 
admirable job. His conviction should not be reversed 
upon the inconsequential grounds presented by appellant. 
As this court said in State v. Neal, 1 Utah 2d 122, 126-
127, 262 P.2d 756 (1953): 
"We are also conscious of the facts 
that a trial in the courts of this state 
is a proceeding in the interest of justice 
to determine the guilt or innocence of 
the accused and not just a game. We 
will not reverse Criminal causes for 
mere error or irregularity. It is only 
when there has been error which is 
both substantial and prejudicial to the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to the rights of the accused that a 
reversal, is warranted." 
Assuming the trial court's ruling constituted 
error, such error was harmless and a reading of the trial 
transcript will quickly show that further extraneous 
allegations by defense counsel would have made no difference. 
See also, Champman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 
17 L.Ed. 705 (1967). 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO ACQUIT THE 
DEFENDANT ON THE GROUNDS OF ENTRAPMENT. 
Appellant contends that his criminal conviction 
for distributing amphetamine, under the Controlled 
Substances Act, ought to be reversed; that he was illegally 
entrapped by a police officer into committing the crime. 
The Utah Supreme Court firmly established the 
standard for entrapment in State v. Pacheco, 13 Utah 2d 
148, 369 P.2d 494 (1962). Justice Crockett stated: 
". . . if defendants attitude 
of mind was such that he desired and 
intended to commit the crime, the mere 
fact that an officer or someone else 
afforded him the opportunity to commit 
it would not constitute entrapment which 
would be a defense to its commission; 
and this would not be less true even 
though an undercover man went alona 
with the defendant in the criminal plan 
and aided or encouraged him in it." 
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Subsection (1) of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303 (Supp. 1973) 
reflects this sound position. 
"Entrapment occurs when a law 
enforcement officer or a person 
directed by or acting in coopera-
tion with the officer induces the 
commission of an offense in order 
to obtain evidence of the commission 
for prosecution by methods creating 
a substantial risk that the offense 
would be committed by one not other-
wise ready to commit it. Conduct 
merely affordinq a person an oppor-
tunity to commit an offense does not • 
constitute entrapment." 
Entrapment is an affirmative defense and one 
that defendant must prove. State v. Good, 110 Ohio App. 
415, 165 N.E.2d 28 (1960). While appellant has made 
many allegations, it has yet to prove that entrapment 
actually occurred. Mere inferences and generalizations 
do not rise to meet the need. Defendant has failed to 
show that the facts surrounding the illegal transaction 
of June 18, 1974, constituted entrapment. The trial 
court was aware of this and remarked, upon concluding 
the entrapment hearing: 
"I have got to decide this question 
based upon whether or not, I can say, as 
a matter of law, that there was entrapment 
in this case. And without even knowing 
any of the evidence relating to these 
transactions, I don't see how I can 
possibly approach them." (H. 112-113) 
Appellant contends that defendant Curtis was 
not predisposed to commit the offense, and that he was 
induced by illegal police conduct. The statute provides Digitized by th  Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the entrapment defense for those who were "not otherwise 
ready to commit [the offense].11 In other words, the 
defendant must have been an "innocent person/' State v. 
Perkins, 19 Utah 2d 241, 432 P.2d 50 (1967), "normally 
law abiding," State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375 (1974), 
who had a "natural reluctance to commit crime to which 
he had no predisposition." State v. Harris, 30 Utah 2d 77, 
513 P.2d 438 (1973). While evidence of the defendant's 
prior criminal activity was inadmissible, except his own 
admission of a felony record, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(6), 
it is clear that from a "totality of the circumstances" the 
trier of fact can find a predisposition toward commission 
of crime. United States v. Rodriguez, 433 F.2d 760 
(1st Cir. 1970). It is clear, from a totality of the cir-
cumstances, that defendant Curtis was predisposed to dis-
tribution of controlled substances. His testimony showed 
that he thrived in the criminal community of Provo 
(TV 60). He testified that he provided hundreds of 
amphetamines to Rose Ann Stout (T.59), and that he received 
them from narcotics suppliers. He knew the prices of 
narcotics and whether or not they were available (H. 34). 
Mrs. Stout testified that at their first meeting the 
defendant offered to supply her with amphetamines (H.39). 
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On the day preceding the violation, June 17, 
it was the defendant who came to Miss Stout's home and 
offered again to supply her with "speed" (T. 8). She 
persuaded him to wait until later in the eveninq, by 
which time the Drug Task Force could have mobilized. 
Defendant Curtis also telephone Miss Stout at the Country 
Club, where she worked, that same day concerning the 
sale that evening (T. 9-10). 
Besides these overt signs of being a ready and 
willing supplier, Curtis ^knowingly committed the crime." 
People v. Nordeste, 125 C.A.2d 462, 270 P.2d 530 (1954); 
thus there is much that can also be deduced logically 
concerning defendant's predisposition. He moved easily 
among drug circles and knew their activities. He had 
no visible means of support, but testified concerning 
that "oil leases" in Vernal, Utah, were his source of 
income (T.66). It is evident that Curtis was not 
"an innocent person" who would not otherwise be engaging 
in criminal conduct. . ." State v. Cowan, 26.Utah 2d 
410, 490 P.2d 890 (1971). 
The defense made allegations during the trial 
concerning "sexual inducements" by Rose Ann Stout, attempt-
ing to show that but for this inducement, Curtis would 
not have sold narcotics to her. Respondent continues to 
deny such relationship occurred, but assuming it did, 
was such action improper? First, appellant fails to Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
cite case law supporting that position! There are many 
cases where the courts have found "emotional inducements" 
entirely within the law. For example, preying on the 
sympathies of a supplier by pretending drug addiction or 
even friendship, are tolerable inducements. Locklayer v. 
State, 317 N.E.2d 863 (Ind. App. 1974), United States v. 
Test, 486 F.2d 922 (10th Cir. 1973). 
Second, the dates involved show that even if 
such a relationship did exist, the more than two months 
without any contact at all between Miss Stout and defend-
ant Curtis shows the inconsistency of the sexual induce-
ment argument. The trial court found this a deciding 
factor in his decision for conviction (T. 112-113), think-
ing it too incredible for belief that two months after 
the illicit relationship terminated, that the only induce-
ment for defendant's illegal sale of narcotics was Miss 
Stout's sexual favors. 
This court recently spoke to this issue in 
State v. Perkins, 19 Utah 2d 421, 432 P.2d 50 (1967): 
"The amount of persuasion should 
not be of importance when it is used 
upon one who is in readiness to commit 
the crime in question. That persuasion 
which induces the criminally inclined 
to lose his wariness is not entrapment 
at all. . ." 
What we have is a forty-seven year old man who 
knew what the law prohibited, understood what he was doing, 
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when he voluntarily, knowingly, and intentionally broke 
it selling five hundred amphetamines for $100 to Rose Ann 
Stout, an undercover agent. The conviction should stand. 
POINT IV 
THE DEFENSE OF PROCURING AGENT IS UNTIMELY ON 
APPEAL; BUT EVEN ASSUMING THAT IT IS PROPERLY BEFORE THE 
COURT, THE EVIDENCE AND FACTS DO NOT SUPPORT SUCH A 
DEFENSE. 
Defendant Curtis was convicted under Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8 (1953), which provides: 
11
. . .it shall be unlawful for any 
person knowingly and intentionally: 
to distribute for value a controlled 
or counterfeit substance." (a)(ii). 
(Emphasis added.) 
The brief submitted by appellant stretches in a 
Procrustean length the definition of "value" as used 
in the statute above. Nowhere is "value defined as 
"profit or gain resulting from the transaction." 
(Appellant Brief, p. 10). To justify such an extreme inter-
pretation it would not be unreasonable to expect applicable 
case law on point, especially since "most statutes" of 
most states are worded thusly. Id., at 10. 
A proper interpretation of this key word may 
be found in Webster1s New International Dictionary, 19 38 
2d Ed. 
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"Value: a fair return in money, 
goods, services, etc., for something 
exchanged; that which is considered 
an equivalent in worth; as, to get 
the value of one's money in a purchase." 
The statute reads "distribute for value" not 
"sell at a profit or gain." The facts show that Curtis 
did distribute for value, (emphasis added) that is, he 
exchanged narcotis for something of equivalent worth, 
$100. Even assuming a profit or gain must result, . 
appellant has failed to show that such a return did not 
occur. 
In the lower court, the defense also failed 
to present the issue of "agency" or the procuring agent 
defense. Furthermore, no contention as to this point was 
made in defendant's Motion to Reverse and Vacate Judgment 
or For New Trial. In fact, defense counsel therein 
admitted the logical possibility of a profit on the 
transaction, the antithesis of the agency defense. Since 
it was not an issue below, it is not properly one now. A 
question not presented at trial, not argued, and not 
set forth in motion for new trial or petition in error 
does not deserve consideration on appeal. Jones v. State, 
341 P.2d 616 (Okla. Cr. 1959). In State v. Starlight Club, 
17 Utah 2d 174, 406 P.2d 912 (1965), where defendants incurred 
a fine and revocation of their nonprofit corporate charter 
for illegally selling liquor, certain constitutional argu-
ments were raised for the first time on appeal. The 
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Supreme Court said: "This was raised the first time on 
appeal and we are not constrained to canvass it." See, 
also, Jaramillo v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 19, 465 P.2d 343 
(1970), State v. Little, 19 Utah 2d 53, 426 P.2d 4 (1967). 
Therefore, respondent contends that the issue is not prop-
erly before this court. 
Even if we assume that the issue of agency or 
"innocent go-between" is properly submitted on appeal, 
a cursory examination of applicable case law will quickly 
demonstrate that defendant Curtis was not acting in the 
procuring agent capacity, as defined by the courts. 
Appellant relies on several cases which he 
describes as fundamental to this defense. In Durham v. 
State, 280 S.W. 2d 737 (Tex. Crim. 1955), the defendant, a 
woman, claimed she was acting in cooperation with the police 
whom she knew to be such, received $6 in advance from the 
agent, went to an identified supplier and bought the police 
agent one capsule of heroin. She was convicted of "selling" 
the substance. But she was able to show that there was 
no benefit to herself, and no sale or transaction with the 
agent. Her conviction was reversed. 
The facts in State v. Smith, 396 S.W.2d 876 
(Tex. Cr. 1965) , were substantially the same. The defendant 
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purchased narcotics from a known supplier for a "revealed" 
police agent who had told the defendant he wanted to make 
a case against the supplier. In Roy v. State/ 87 Nev. 517,. 
489 P.2d 1158 (1971), also cited by appellant, the Supreme 
Court of Nevada unanimously reversed the conviction of a 
twenty-two year old mentally retarded bus boy who had 
purchased a "lid" of marijuana at the request of a friendly 
police agent. The Court found that appellant was acting 
solely for recipient, not "selling" anything. Posey v. 
State, 507 P.2d 576 (Okla. Cr. 1973), is also cited 
by appellant as controlling. This case, however, involved 
codefendants who were given $20 by a police agent and told 
not to buy hashish for more than $15. The two men entered 
a nearby resident, were gone for five or ten minutes, 
then returned to the officerfs car. Posey handed the offi-
cer an aluminum foil wrapper, Mayes handed him a $5 bill 
and told him they had gotten the price down to $15. Posey's 
conviction for "selling" was reversed. 
Finally, appellants cited United States v. Moses, 
220 F.2d 166 (3d Cir. 1955), as the "rule simply stated." 
Simply stated, the facts of the case at bar do not, by 
any stretch of the imagination, resemble the Moses case. 
Marie Moses, a young drug addicted woman of twenty-six, 
referred federal undercover agents to a seller, introduced 
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them, and vouched for them. There was no showing that she 
either collaborated with the seller, or received anything 
from the buyers, yet she was convicted of selling narcotics. 
There can be no doubt that she was wrongly convicted and 
justly acquitted. 
From the events surrounding the sale to Rose 
Ann Stout of five hundred amphetamine "whites" by defendant 
Curtis for $100, the elements of the procuring agent defense, 
as brought out above, cannot be found. 
First, there was an actual sale, an exchange 
for value, by Mr. Curtis. Miss Stout paid for the pills 
at the exchange and had not entrusted the defendant with 
the money earlier. 
Second, there is no identified seller or 
supplier other than the defendant. He has failed to estab-
lish himself as a "go-between." 
Third, appellant has not shown that no profit 
or gain resulted form the sale. 
Fourth, Curtis never alleged that he suspected 
Miss Stout was an undercover agent, or knew her to be one. 
His only defense is that she repeatedly asked him for pills, 
two months before the transaction. Even if we.assume this 
is true, it is no defense. In State v. Akin, 75 N.M. 308, 
404 P.2d 134 (1965), a police agent's persistent inquiries 
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as to whether defendant had marijuana and his constant 
suggestions that he was in the market showed no more 
offers of opportunity to commit the crime, and were held 
valid. 
Finally, what we have seen in each "procuring 
agent" case above is something akin to the description 
provided in Justice Henroid's persuasive dissent in State 
v. Schultz, 27 Utah 2d 391, 496 P.2d 893 (1972), as to 
the difference between the defendant's status as a seller 
or distributor of narcotics and the "go-between agent." 
Judge for yourselves whether or not the defendant Patry 
Curtis, who knowingly and intentionally violated the 
law can be described as "a nutty go-between" intending 
no offense save that of being altruistically stupid." We 
think not, and submit that the conviction must stand. 
CONCLUSION • 1 
Based upon the above arguments of facts and 
law, respondent respectfully urcres that the lower court 
be affirmed. |. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY | 
Attorney General | 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT j 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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